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Engineering in the American Civil War. University of Alabama Press, $59.95
ISBN 9780817319861
In Engines of Rebellion Saxton T. Bisbee surveys the history of Southern steam
machinery across those ironclads laid down by the Confederate Navy Department during the
Civil War. The book is comprehensive in describing the mechanical composition of 23
completed and 4 nearly-completed rebel warships (this out of about 50 armoured vessels that
the Richmond government are known to have commissioned between 1861 and 1865). Bisbee
hereby brings to bear his considerable experience in marine heritage and archaeology, being
an alumni of East Carolina University’s maritime research programs, and a manager and
nautical archaeologist at Northwest Seaport Maritime Heritage Center in Seattle.
The book provides a power plant inventory for each of the Confederate vessels
launched. Highly technical and forensic in this examination of steam machine configuration, it
makes itself more user-friendly in providing an extensive glossary explaining specialist
terminology, in reproducing diagrams, plans, and cross-sections, and in offering contemporary
paintings and photographs of several of the warships. The in-depth specifications of the vessels
are also supplemented by biographies which relate the profiles and experiences of the
constructors, engineers, and operators who served on board, in addition to the combat actions
in which they were engaged. This further increases the monograph’s accessibility, as does
Bisbee categorising the ironclads into standardised ‘classes’, these groupings comprising each
of the subsequent chapters. The classes were essentially defined by evolving design
characteristics, though the author acknowledges it to be a slightly arbitrary tool of convenience
as Confederate administrators struggled to work to neat blueprints - forced into constant
improvisation by the South’s weak industrial base, material and manpower shortages, scarcity
of ship yards/dry docks, and time pressures bought on the war.
Prior to this detailed itemisation of the Southern fleet, Bisbee devotes the first chapter
to the nature of contemporary machine components in general, helpfully assessing the relative
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merits of the various systems. For example, although propellers had not yet fully overtaken
paddlewheels, Bisbee conveys how and why nearly all the completed Confederate ironclads
were fitted with screw-propulsion. This was predominantly to safeguard “the ship’s drive
system from battle damage and ramming” since the “submerged, recessed nature of the
propeller allowed for greater protection”. (184) The drawback was that this better concealment
of screws resulted in a “more complicated emplacement and machinery connections (which)
often caused trouble in those early days of steam propulsion” and as with most of the concurrent
new technologies being harnessed, they were “more difficult to manufacture and maintain”.
(184)
Proceeding to the Southern ironclad program, the first categorisation – “conversions” were those that had been adapted from previous incarnations: a United States steam frigate in
the case of the famous CSS Virginia (formerly the USS Merrimack) and harbor towboats in
terms of the CSS Baltic of Mobile Bay and the CSS Manassas (formerly the Enoch Train) of
New Orleans. Bisbee argues that this first group, together with the new prototypes which
constituted the second classification (named “early non-standard designs”) suffered from a
conflict over operational purpose. This tension was over shallow-water river and coast defence,
or alternatively sallying out to attack Federal blockaders at sea. (60) Bisbee contends that this
tactical dichotomy negated the prospects for a swift and smooth deployment. For instance, as
the new crafts Louisiana, Georgia, and Arkansas were “uncommonly large … the Confederacy
lost valuable time and resources in constructing them, instead of building several smaller
vessels better suited for a specific harbour defense role like the Richmond class ironclads” these latter being the third category of vessels that Bisbee goes on to describe. (8)
The author also highlights other competing theories and mindsets which afflicted
Confederate steam manufacturing, for example clashes between civilian and naval engineers
over the operating systems. In the case of the renowned Arkansas in particular, despite its
exploits on the Mississippi, “naval engineers and civil appointees butted heads over proper
handling, and the ship’s loss may have been a direct result”. (84-85) What Bisbee thus also
draws out, is that the comparatively new nature of both steam-machine engineering as a science
and ironclads as modern weapons of war, led to inevitable set-backs as constructers and
operators tried to serve their cause in what were still largely developing and experimental
fields. The book maintains however that continuous improvement and refinement was made as
the war proceeded, a theme likewise served well by Bisbee’s division of the warships into
classifications in that this mandates a largely chronological structure.
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The arguments in Engines of Rebellion echo traditional historical scholarship in
recognising the naval disparity between the Union and Confederacy at the war’s outbreak, ably
illustrating that following the first wave of secession the combined naval armament of all seven
rebel states amounted to less than that of a single US sloop of war. (5) The details Bisbee
provides about ironclad construction however also draw attention to a possibly more neglected
reason why Virginia’s defection to the Confederacy proved especially significant. Of course,
it is identified that President Jefferson Davis and Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory
profited from inheriting the Gosport Navy Yard (including the remains of the sunken
Merrimack) as well as the Tredegar Iron Works and Shockoe Foundary - this latter became the
Confederate Naval Works and was “only surpassed in size and output by neighbouring
Tredegar, which Shockoe often supplied with parts and material” (90). However, it is also
striking how many central figures in rebel ironclad production were native Virginians: these
including the designer of nearly all ship types, Chief Naval Constructor John Luke Porter;
Engineer in Chief William P. Williamson; and Head of the Office of Ordnance and
Hydrography John M. Brooke. Of these, Porter and Williamson were not “pro-secession” and
both “opposed slavery”, however all three remained loyal to their state and as a result the
Confederacy reaped the benefits of their expertise. (43, 46) In the same way that the defections
of Virginians Lee, Jackson, and J.E.B Stuart fundamentally altered the complexion of the war
on land, the Confederacy’s surprising success at times on water can similarly be attributed to
these and other core personnel hailing from Old Dominion - ironic when some of the chief
architects of ultimate Union victory by sea were native and resident Virginians who remained
loyal to the national flag, such as David Glasgow Farragut and Samuel Phillips Lee.
The book also endorses the conventional interpretation that Mallory was a singularly
fine administrator in his attempts to neutralise Northern advantages through the ingenuity and
adaptation referred to, pioneering new naval technologies to compensate for Southern
industrial paucity: quality over quantity. Nonetheless despite the progress and trial-and-error
improvement that Bisbee displays the Confederacy achieved throughout the war, it remains
evident that this trajectory was not always linear or consistent. For example, even though an
obvious source of Southern weakness was its lack of infrastructure to construct purpose-built
machinery - thus often having to rely on second-hand sets taken from other ships such as
western river or tugboats - it did not always follow that this was the primary handicap for those
vessels. The CSS Tennessee for example acquitted itself remarkably well despite receiving old
machinery, as did the Virginia - even more noteworthy when considering that this vessel’s
renovated engines were those severely damaged in the Merrimack’s attempted destruction
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during Norfolk’s evacuation. Conversely, desirable as it was to provide the new ships with
dedicated custom-built power plants, even when this was possible they could still turn out to
be flawed, as in the case of the Georgia and the Arkansas (this, as alluded to, contributing to
the latter’s demise.)
These mutable results in output are also summed up by the diverging careers of the
Raleigh and the North Carolina, which the author displays “could not have been more different
despite being of the same class and built in the same city: the North Carolina was poorly built
and a slow failure, whereas the Raleigh was stated to be one of the finest examples of
Confederate ironclad construction during its all-too-brief career” (105) Overall therefore the
book makes clear that constructing or procuring well-functioning steam machinery for their
ironclads was the one of the most fraught tasks for the Confederate Navy Department in their
maritime contest with the North. Engines of Rebellion provides a valuable reference point for
the dimensions of Confederate naval progress throughout the conflict and, with Bisbee’s final
contention that “Stephen Mallory’s vision allowed for the creation of what may tentatively be
labelled the first all-modern navy”, potentially that of ironclad and steam engineering
development in general. (186)
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